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How thorough a democrat was Zhao Ziyang? Thisis an important question if one believes that politi-cal change in China is likely to come from the top
down. Although the Party chiefs say they are leading China
toward democracy, there is much debate about what they
mean. (1) Among recent CCP leaders, Zhao was probably
the most sympathetic to a conception of democracy resem-
bling Western views. Others around him may have been
more radical, such as Bao Tong and Li Rui (who wrote pref-
aces for this book), Li Shenzhi, and Zhao’s conversation
partner Zong Fengming, (2) but they were not in a position to
implement their ideas. Zhao had been in such a position.
His views give us a sense of the likely outer limits of the
ideas about democracy that might be held within the leader-
ship, at least in his generation and probably in the current,
apparently more conservative, generation of leaders as well. 
Among sources on Zhao, this book is a precious document.
Before its publication we had two pieces of evidence to help
us assess Zhao’s views on democracy. Wu Guoguang’s book
on the work of the Political Reform Office in 1987
described the discussions that led to the proposals for sepa-
rating Party and government and Party and enterprise man-
agement in Zhao’s Political Report to the 13th Party
Congress. (3) The Tiananmen Papers described Zhao’s deci-
sion-making under pressure during the 1989 crisis, when he
believed (as he repeats here) that he could have solved the
crisis if Deng Xiaoping had agreed to withdraw the threat to
punish the student demonstrators implied in the April 26
Renmin ribao editorial. (4) But these books left many ques-
tions unanswered. The Political Reform Office discussed
many subjects, but Zhao seldom revealed his own views.
The events of 1989 revealed Zhao’s instincts in dealing with
an immediate crisis but did not expose his thoughts about
long-term political reform. The new book is thus a valuable
addition to a small corpus. 
Zong Fengming was an old friend of Zhao’s who had
entered the Party at the same time and worked together with
him in central China during the revolution. After 1949,
Zong served in such posts as Party secretary in the
University of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (Hangkong hangtian
daxue) and adviser to the State
Economic Reform Commission
(Guojia tigaiwei) (17 (5)). From July
1991 to October 2004, a period of 13
years, Zong visited Zhao at his home
for a series of more than 100 meet-
ings. With Zhao’s knowledge, Zong
went home and took notes from mem-
ory (zhuiji), saving them to publish
after Zhao’s death, which occurred in
January 2005.
But the evidence in Captive
Conversations needs to be interpreted
carefully. Even though the loss of
political power freed Zhao to talk
with Zong and other visitors, we gath-
er from allusions scattered throughout
the book that he still had to be careful
about what he said. Zong’s account of
Zhao’s conditions of house arrest is
not only fascinating in itself as a
glimpse at how the Party deals with
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1. For example, John L. Thornton, “Long Time Coming: The Prospects for Democracy in
China,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008, pp. 2-22; Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s
Political Trajectory: What Are the Chinese Saying?” in Cheng Li, ed., China’s Changing
Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution
Press, 2008, pp. 25-43.
2. On Zong’s ideological evolution, see his memoir, Lixiang, xinnian, zhuiqiu: wo de ren-
sheng huigu yu fansi jian he Zhao Ziyang tanhua de yixie huiyi (Ideals, faith, and search:
recollections and reflections on my life, with some reminiscences of my conversations
with Zhao Ziyang ), Hong Kong, Huanqiu shiye [Xianggang] gongsi, 2005.
3. Wu Guoguang, Zhao Ziyang yu zhengzhi gaige (Zhao Ziyang and political reform), Hong
Kong, Taipingyang shiji yanjiusuo chubanshe, 1997.
4. Zhang Liang, comp., Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers,
N.Y., PublicAffairs, 2001. This is based on the fuller set of documents in Zhang Liang,
comp., Zhongguo ‘liusi’ zhenxiang (The truth of China’s ‘June Fourth’), 2 vols., Carle
Place, Long Island, Mingjing chubanshe, 2001. In Captive Conversations Zhao spends
considerable time reminiscing about key events in 1989. These reminiscences are con-
sistent with the material contained in TAMP.
5. Numbers in parentheses refer to pages in the book.
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its fallen leaders, but also provides a necessary context for
interpreting Zhao’s remarks.Z ha o’s  condi tio ns o f hous ea r re st  a nd the  c onve r sa tions
Zhao spent his fifteen-and-a-half years of house arrest at
Number 6 Fuqiang hutong, in Beijing. Zong says that the
house was previously occupied by Hu Yaobang (1), so it
must not have been Zhao’s own house or one he had occu-
pied previously, but one assigned by the central Party appa-
ratus for the purpose of house arrest. It was a traditional
Beijing siheyuan with three courtyards. Zong says that the
street was quiet and the house was guarded by a group of
soldiers posted inside the big front gate. The front courtyard
was occupied by the guards and by a secretarial office and
sleeping rooms. The second courtyard was Zhao’s study,
and the inner courtyard contained the family living quarters.
Besides Zhao and his wife, Liang Boqi, the compound
housed one of their daughters and her husband and son. 
Zong believed that he was Zhao’s first visitor when he came
in July 1991. He got in by announcing to the guards that was
a qigong master with an appointment. The guards demand-
ed his ID and he claimed to have forgotten it. After a bit of
shouting back and forth to one another, the guards let him
in and did not register him. 
Zong divides the series of meetings into two periods. The
first 47 meetings through September 1997 were conducted
under relatively relaxed conditions. In that month Zhao
wrote a letter to the 15th Party Congress calling for a re-eval-
uation of the June Fourth incident, and the letter was leaked
to the international press via Hong Kong. In response, the
leadership tightened restrictions on Zhao. The second set of
34 meetings from 1998 through 2004 occurred less frequent-
ly, and less of interest was said (or at least reported here).
The first six of the meetings took place while the Party
Centre was still conducting its investigation of Zhao. Then
in October 1992 a delegation consisting of Qiao Shi, Song
Ping, Li Tieying, and Ding Guan’gen visited Zhao and told
him that the investigation into his case was finished and that
the “two conclusions” would not change. (These were the
conclusions of the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central
Committee that Zhao had “supported turmoil” and “split
the party.”) Zhao demanded to learn the findings of the
investigation and that they be published within the “appro-
priate circle,” but neither of these requests was granted.
Zhao and his friends felt sure that the investigation – led by
Wang Renzhong (67) – had turned up nothing. But they
believed that because Deng Xiaoping’s prestige was on the
line the results were predetermined. 
The high-ranking visitors informed Zhao that his freedom
was restored. However, they added, in using this freedom he
should observe discipline, not go out during the 14th Party
Congress, which was being held that month, and not see
reporters (64-65). Gradually Zhao was able to see a few
more visitors in addition to Zong. These included Liao Jili,
Yu Guangyuan, and Cai Decheng (94 ff., 104 ff., 115 ff.),
retired pro-reform officials with whom Zhao discussed eco-
nomic theory, socialism, Marx’s ideas, problems of building
socialism in a backward society, and so forth. They also
included Yang Jisheng, Shi Binhai, and Zhang Guangyou,
high level Party journalists who sympathetically interviewed
Zhao, although not for publication (195, 211-17, 232, 245). 
But as time went by, the extent of Zhao’s freedom proved
limited. For example, he was denied permission to go to a
high-level cadres’ fitness club near Zhongnanhai to play ten-
nis. When he insisted that he would walk, his minders yield-
ed, but they would take him only on Tuesday and Thursday
mornings, when the club was not open and no one else was
there (101-102). Likewise when Zhao wanted to play golf
he was allowed to go only to a specific course where, pre-
sumably, he would not attract attention (102). 
As the restrictions imposed after the ostensible 1992 freeing
became clear, Zhao and his friends were outraged. Zhao
wrote letters to Jiang Zemin to protest, claiming that the
restrictions violated the Party and state constitutions. Word
was passed back that he should behave more like Hua
Guofeng, who voluntarily kept himself out of sight because
of his regard for political stability (102). Zhao and his
friends speculated that the regime believed that any public
appearance by Zhao would be a threat to Jiang’s power.
They complained that Jiang cared only about staying in
power, not about any vision for China (117). 
Even so, the conditions of house arrest were loose enough
so that Zhao was able to write and distribute his letter to the
15th Party Congress. He used Zong to pass along two of the
copies, and we are not told how he passed the others (259).
Zhao thought about asking Wan Li and Yang Shangkun to
write similar letters urging the party to correct the historical
record about June Fourth (249, 251), but ultimately he was
the only one to write. After the leak of the letter, all of
Zhao’s guards were changed (265), his daughter and her
family had to move out (265, although in 2002 it is men-
tioned that she is living there again because Zhao’s wife is
not well), he temporarily lost his ability to have visitors
except for direct relatives, and he could not go out to play
137N o  2 0 0 8 / 3
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golf (260, 261). All this, he was told, was not house arrest,
but was for social stability (339). 
Eight months after this tightening, in May 1998, Zong
Fengming was able to visit again, arranging in advance by
telephone for Mrs. Zhao to meet him at the outer gate,
where he argued to the guards that he was an old revolution-
ary comrade of hers, over 80 years old, who had travelled a
long distance, and that it would be “tai shuobuguoqu” not to
let him come in. Somehow this worked (265). Again, and
he doesn’t say how, he managed to get in on June 4, 1998
(266), and on a series of occasions thereafter. But the con-
versations were now more constrained. Eventually things
eased up again; we learn that Zhao played golf, and, in
2003, that he travelled outside of Beijing (339, 346). Zong
was again able to bring guests with him from time to time
(311, 318, 356). 
During both periods of confinement Zhao and his wife evi-
dently lived with considerable anxiety. Zhao held his conver-
sations with Zong on wicker chairs that he brought out into
the courtyard to avoid bugging (1, 63, and elsewhere).
Zhao’s wife kept an eye out in all directions while they were
talking lest there be someone taking photographs. In a 1993
conversation, Zhao referred to the possibility that if the left-
ists were to gain strength he could be gotten rid of in a
staged car accident (137). Another time he mentioned the
possibility that his house might be ransacked (141). Zhao
talked often about how the government sent Bao Tong to jail
as a way of hurting him (e.g., 244). At one point Zhao had
Zong pass a message to Bao telling him to be careful so as
not to cause too much trouble for himself. But Bao turned
down this advice, saying he had been warned by the author-
ities but intended to continue to talk to foreign reporters and
was not afraid of going back to Qincheng Prison even if he
would never emerge from a second imprisonment alive
(276). 
In the conversations, Zhao seems well informed, but it is not
clear how he got information. He mentions the idea of writ-
ing his memoirs (75), but says that he is denied access to his
own papers, even his public speeches (29, 102, 186 and
elsewhere). He discusses with approval books by He
Qinglian (Xiandaihua xianjing, 224, 300), Gordon Chang
(The Coming Collapse of China, 333), and Gao Wenqian
(Wannian Zhou Enlai, 354). He mentions watching televi-
sion (232). And he is aware of a conference of Chinese
scholars on Chinese reform that took place at Columbia in
2004 (384). As I recall, this conference was reported in the
New York Chinese language press, and Zhao may have read
about it in a periodical such as Cankao xiaoxi. 
Zhao and his visitors gossip about current political events. In
the early 1990s Zhao’s friends watched the political battle
in the leadership and speculated that Deng might bring
Zhao back to power. Zhao says it will never happen.
Because Yang Shangkun does not support what was done on
June 4, Deng can no longer trust him, fearing that the ver-
dict would be reversed under a Yang leadership. Hence the
Yangs are out of power and Deng cannot get rid of Jiang
Zemin and Li Peng, no matter how dissatisfied he is with
them (59, 73-75, 101, 156, 186). Deng is trapped by June
Fourth and cannot bring Zhao back (125). The friends
watch disapprovingly as Jiang Zemin consolidates power
and builds himself as “core,” with elements of a cult of per-
sonality (242).
In his conversations with Zong, Zhao seems to have spoken
intentionally for posterity, summoning Zong when he want-
ed to say something and setting the topics for the conversa-
tions. (6) But he spoke guardedly. He often talked about how
to respond to problems that he thought China was facing,
but he never made a clear statement about what form of
political system would be best for China in principle. Zhao’s
thoughts went through a further filter when they were put
into notes by Zong. Because of the presence of guards,
Zong could not make recordings or take notes on the spot,
but went home and wrote notes from memory after each
meeting. However, Zong says, Zhao reviewed the manu-
script as it was written (19, 399), which must have provided
an opportunity to correct errors, but potentially also to soft-
en statements that may have been too frank. Besides Zhao,
other people contributed to the manuscript. Zong thanks Du
Runsheng, Li Rui, Hu Jiwei, An Zhiwen, and Bao Tong for
reviewing the manuscript and offering corrections, noting
that Li Rui went over the entire manuscript carefully and
offered revisions for “choice of words, implications, and
punctuation” (399). These people may have altered Zhao’s
formulations to make them either stronger or weaker.
In short, what we have here are neither Zhao's literal words
nor his unmediated thoughts. This makes it hard to be sure
that the book gives us a full, accurate grasp of his thinking.
On the one hand, Zong and other editors such as Li Rui
may have sharpened some of Zhao’s ideas. Alternatively,
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Zhao may have made indirect statements that he counted on
Chinese readers to understand as meaning more than he
explicitly said. This is one possible implication of Bao
Tong’s sarcastic remark in his preface, challenging the cen-
sors to find anything here that would justify banning the
book – as of course they did – from import from Hong Kong
(11). Despite all these caveats, the book offers new insight
into Zhao’s views on democracy.Z ha o o n de mo cra cy  
Zhao’s conversations with Zong are not the systematic
thoughts of a political philosopher, or of a policy study group
such as the Party School group, whose recent blueprint for
political reform, Gongjian, in many ways resembles Zhao’s
ideas, (7) but rather the wide-ranging, somewhat miscella-
neous ideas of a political actor who is interested in current
problems and practical solutions. Zhao believed that most of
China’s problems in the 1990s could be addressed by open-
ing up the Chinese political system without creating a chal-
lenge to CCP rule, and he optimistically believed that such
a controlled opening was realistically possible. 
Zhao’s views on current political problems are embedded in
a stage view of social change. According to a theory that he
adopted from liberal brain-trusters when he was in power,
and which is still in official use today, (8) China is in the “pre-
liminary stage” (chuji jieduan) of socialism. This is the stage
at which a developing country moves from poverty to mod-
erate wealth by developing a commodity economy according
to the rules of the market – a process also described as
“making up missed lessons” of capitalism, because in Marx’s
theory this stage of economic development should have
taken place before the socialist revolution (45, elsewhere). 
Zhao says that he used to believe that the country needed
strong authoritarian leaders to force the bureaucracy to
accept this yielding of power for the purpose of modernisa-
tion – the view known in China as neo-authoritarianism
(234). He says he had nothing directly to do with Wu
Jiaxiang, the party theorist who coined that term when Zhao
was in power, but that he was aware of it and agreed with it
at the time. But, he says, his view changed in 1987 when he
moved from the premiership to the post of general secretary. 
Before 1987 I didn’t concern myself with [political
democracy] much. First, [as premier] I was working
on economic reform [not political reform]; second, I
was very busy with the work of the State Council and
had no time to think about it; also, I did not under-
stand ideological issues well; and finally there were
other people handling that area. After I became
General Secretary in 1987 I started to explore it. My
general view was that the Party interfered too much
in government departments and mass organisations. It
concerned itself with all kinds of matters. Likewise
the Party interfered in various aspects of individuals’
lives, including private life. This was no good. I once
brought up the idea that there should be less interfer-
ence in literary works, not meaning that there should
be no management, but that we should set a direction
for a given time – what should be praised, what
should be opposed – and make this clear. But with
respect to specific works we should not interfere, the
Party committee should involve itself little, and as
long as a work did not violate the law we should not
manage it. On this point Wang Meng [then Minister
of Culture] told me this was a good policy and one
that he supported. At this time my guiding ideas
were, first, that the leading position of the CCP could
not change, but the Party’s form of leadership must
change; second, that a socialist state should be a rule
of law state (146).
Having become interested in political reform, Zhao came to
think that China needed three categories of political change,
although he does not divide them so clearly himself. 
First, the Party should yield power over economic decision-
making to provinces, enterprises, and individuals so that they
can manage efficiently their own affairs in the commodity
economy (46, 79-82, 149, elsewhere). The previous need
for repression grew out of the decision to rely on will power
and political commands to push an immature economy to
develop. Under reform, development is promoted by incen-
tivising it, so that it occurs as a consequence of people’s vol-
untary actions (92-93). Zhao uses democracy and rule of
law as labels for management methods that suit the commod-
ity economy because they allow people to make their own
decisions (129). Also, he notes that social group interests
will diversify under market conditions, which he says makes
the demand for democracy a global trend (148-149, else-
where). 
Second, democracy involves changes in the inner workings
of the ruling party (dangnei minzhu). The devolution of
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power for economic growth gives rise to corruption and
polarisation of wealth (239, 383, elsewhere). These devel-
opments are contrary to the Party’s ultimate Marxian goals
– which he still believes are glorious – and could be fatal to
its hold on power. The only way to check such trends is to
let society supervise those in power. If power is too concen-
trated then corruption cannot be stopped. Leninist party-
building techniques are no longer appropriate. The Party
must renew itself (ziwo gengxin).
In this category of intra-Party democracy, Zhao offers five
specific ideas. First, big decisions should be made in fact
and not only in theory by the full Politburo, not by the small-
er Standing Committee or by the General Secretary alone,
and leadership should be exercised on a rotating basis by
PBSC members to avoid over-concentration of power in one
person. Second, Party, government, and financial affairs
should be open (gongkai); cadres should be selected not by
black-box command methods but by multi-candidate direct
elections, at the village, township, county, and municipal lev-
els “at first” (but what later on? – he does not say). Third,
the Party should let the masses “participate in managing”
(canyu guanli) their own affairs, for which Zhao again uses
the term “social democracy.” This means that party officials
should not interfere in the decision-making scope of enter-
prises and government agencies. To reduce its practice of
doing so, the Party should abolish the various duikou struc-
tures which place every government organ under a corre-
sponding Party body through Party cells and committees.
Also as part of social democracy, channels should be creat-
ed for dialogue with farmers, workers, and intellectuals. The
work of supervision (jiandu gongzuo) should be carried out
by trade unions in industry and villager self-government
organs in the villages.
Fourth, the Party should allow freedom of speech, so that
public opinion can supervise government (yulun jiandu),
because this is the only effective way to prevent corruption
and official abuse of citizens’ rights (gongmin quanli). The
people should have access to information so as to increase
transparency (zengjia toumingdu). Allowing the “human
right” (renquan) of freedom of speech, Zhao notes, is
appropriate. It is not the same thing as democracy: Hong
Kong under the British, he says in 1994, is not a democrat-
ic system, but human rights are protected there (132-133).
Fifth, the Party’s political thought work should be reformed
to get rid of leftist influences and unify thinking around
Deng Xiaoping’s theory of reform and opening (all five
points from pp. 166-167 with some details added from a pas-
sage where the same ideas are stated on pp. 148-149).
Zhao’s third set of ideas about democracy involve the state
system itself – that is, the set of institutions that most
Westerners have in mind when we think about whether or not
China will democratise. On this subject, Zhao’s ideas were
cautious for the near term and vague about the long term. 
When we say we must modernise, it is no different
from saying we have to Westernise – to implement
the whole Western package (shixing Xifang de
yitao). But to implement Western multiparty politics
and parliamentary government won’t do at present….
As China’s leadership levels develop, several differ-
ent groups may emerge (keneng hui chuxian jitao
mache). At the leadership level China should put
stress on the functions of the NPC and CPPCC to
create some power balance; carry out local self-gov-
ernment, develop the functions of the mass organisa-
tions, including the trade union and women’s associ-
ation and of the [united front] democratic parties
(minzhu dangpai), so as to create a framework in
which the representatives of various [social] interests
balance one another through the NPC and
CPPCC. After going through that transition, the
next step of implementing democratic politics and
establishing a democratic political structure will be
relatively realistic (171). 
He does not say, however, what this next step will be or
what stage of economic development will make it possible.
Zhao acknowledges that it is not obvious how to make these
general principles work. The time is not ripe for multiple
political parties, because that would endanger CCP rule
(184, 344). But Sun Yat-sen’s idea of tutelage was right: the
people should be led by stages to accept constitutional gov-
ernment (xianzheng). Meanwhile, China might benefit from
parliamentary democracy (yihui minzhu). Gu Zhun – a
Cultural Revolution victim whose philosophical writings
were published posthumously in 1994 to great acclaim – was
right in saying that parliamentary democracy is eventually
necessary, Zhao says (183, 231). But what does this mean?
Zhao clarifies that parliamentary democracy means the exis-
tence in parliament of a legal opposition faction (hefa de fan-
duipai) that does not challenge the ruling party's hold on
power. This was the system he understood to be in place in
Taiwan at the time he was speaking (116, 219). 
Taiwan is a small place and the people’s levels of edu-
cation and culture are different from ours. They went
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through a transitional period and now they have one
large party and one small party. At this point they still
can’t have alternations in power, but they have a legal
opposition faction (234). 
He once thought such a system would naturally emerge in
China, but it has not. 
I used to think that after the strongman Deng
Xiaoping departed, people with various different
political views would emerge in the Party Centre and
would check one another. But now it appears that this
view was wrong. As soon as they get into power they
form a single interest group, and to protect the vested
interests of this group they take a unified position
towards everyone on the outside (340).
Zhao acknowledges that implementing a parliamentary sys-
tem in China would not be straightforward.
The most complicated problem is [the role of] the
National People’s Congress (NPC). The NPC is a
power organ. For it to play its role involves the ques-
tion of how it relates to its Party committee and to
the government. If the Party exercises its leadership
through the Party members who are delegates so
that the will of the Party becomes law, then this is
not reform; the Party members vote together and
the NPC has no function. But if the Party members
are freed from their Party roles to decide for them-
selves how to vote in the NPC, this could create
chaos (147)
Below the central level, Zhao’s ideas for reform of the state
system are even less fully developed.
As for basic-level democracy (jiceng minzhu), we need
to put people managing their own affairs on the agen-
da. The masses should manage their own affairs as
much as possible, we should protect citizens’ rights –
these should be protected by law…. Each unit should
basically carry out direct democracy (zhijie minzhu),
first of all democratic elections to carry out villager self-
government (cunmin zizhi). The cities can also imple-
ment direct democracy and so too for xian magistrates.
Provinces should have multi-candidate elections (cha’e
xuanju). Single-candidate elections without choice can
hardly be called direct democracy (147).
There can, he concludes, be no single model. The goal of
political reform is to protect fairness of distribution and
hence allow the development of a large middle class (230).
Society will find its way through practice. As Zong
Fengming summarises, economic growth combined with fair
distribution remain Zhao’s key goals, with political reform a
means to that end (395). 
Zhao, in short, believed in what we might call “glasnost
authoritarianism” for the China of his day – a system of one-
party rule with enough political openness to allow citizens to
criticise officials but not enough to allow a rival political
force to overthrow the ruling party. His belief in such a
model rested on an implicit premise: that the regime did not
have enemies strong enough to take advantage of openness
to overthrow it. It was a premise that many of Zhao’s high-
level colleagues did not accept during Tiananmen and do not
accept now. The Tiananmen Papers are full of reports from
the state security authorities, the Beijing municipal Party
committee, and others warning that domestic and foreign
enemies were using the student demonstrators to pose a mor-
tal threat to the regime. (9) Since 1989, the regime has
argued tirelessly that the repression saved China from the
fate of the Soviet Union. (10)
Zhao, however, looking back on 1989 in his conversations
with Zong, held to his original view. He believed that the
students were willing to leave the Square right after Hu
Yaobang’s memorial service, but that they were held there
by the fear of repercussions: to remove that fear would have
been the key to settling the conflict. He says he could have
made peace with the students through dialogue on three
occasions. First, the students would have gone back to class-
es after they held their own ceremonies to mourn Hu
Yaobang, if Zhao’s instructions had been followed to talk to
them respectfully without sharpening contradictions. Instead,
while he was on an official visit to North Korea, the hardlin-
ers persuaded Deng Xiaoping to issue the April 26 People’s
Daily editorial, which labelled the demonstrations a “tur-
moil” (dongluan) and thus threatened the students with ret-
ribution. Second, after his return from North Korea, Zhao
signalled a softer tone in his speech to the Asian
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Development Bank and suggested that the Party take new
steps to fight corruption, hoping to lower tensions and open
a way to win over the students on the basis of “democracy
and rule of law.” But the hardliners undercut him again by
insisting that he did not speak for the Party centre and that
Deng Xiaoping’s evaluation of the situation was irreversible.
Third, at the May 16 Politburo Standing Committee meet-
ing Zhao proposed to issue a revision of the April 26 edito-
rial’s line, and to take public responsibility for its errors even
though he had never had a chance to approve the text. Li
Peng, however, blocked this proposal on the grounds that
Deng Xiaoping’s original words could not be changed (50-
53). 
We will never know whether Zhao was right about the abil-
ity of one-Party rule to survive and even be strengthened by
public criticism. But views like Li Peng’s and Deng
Xiaoping’s continue to guide the Party today. The regime
continues to choose repressive, rather than open, authoritar-
ianism as its political model. Concl usio n 
In interpreting Zhao, as any thinker, we have to attend both
to the details of what he says and to the context in which he
is speaking. In his conversations with Zong he was not
engaged in the debate that engages many in the West –
whether China will become like the West – but in a differ-
ent debate – how China can combine economic growth with
justice. He answers questions we don’t ask and doesn’t
answer questions we do ask. The word democracy means
different things to him than it does to us.
In the end we cannot conclude that Zhao wanted to bring
China toward democracy as we define it, although we also
cannot conclude that his mind was closed to that long-term
outcome. The Zhao of these conversations was committed
to no specific political endpoint. He viewed political institu-
tions as instrumental rather than primary, designed to serve
the more fundamental goals of economic development plus
fair distribution, a combination he referred to as “scientific
socialism.” He was willing to adjust political institutions as
new challenges to these goals emerged. 
Zhao’s actions may have spoken more loudly than his words.
His preference for dialogue during June Fourth showed an
openness to the idea of political accountability. And as Zong
points out, after June Fourth, Zhao broke with the tradition
of purged leaders bowing to Party criticism. At the Fourth
Plenum of the 13th Central Committee he gave a speech
refuting the Party’s decision that he had done wrong (it is
reprinted in Captive Conversations, pp. 6-21). Through the
years of his house arrest he never bowed to the Party’s tra-
dition that he should accept blame. Zong Fengming praises
this “Zhao Ziyang model” of personal integrity as a wel-
come contrast to the long line of previous CCP leaders from
Peng Dehuai to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Hu
Yaobang, who yielded to the Party’s demand to admit error
even though history showed that their positions had been
correct (14). In standing up for what he believed in, Zhao
planted a small seed that could grow into a pillar of an even-
tual Chinese democracy. •
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